Abstract-Hypothesis testing is a statistical inference framework for determining the true distribution among a set of possible distributions for a given data set. Privacy restrictions may require the curator of the data or the respondents themselves to share data with the test only after applying a randomizing privacy mechanism. This work considers mutual information (MI) as the privacy metric for measuring leakage. In addition, motivated by the Chernoff-Stein lemma, the relative entropy between pairs of distributions of the output (generated by the privacy mechanism) is chosen as the utility metric. For these metrics, the goal is to find the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) and the corresponding optimal privacy mechanism for both binary and m-ary hypothesis testing. Focusing on the high privacy regime, Euclidean information-theoretic approximations of the binary and m-ary PUT problems are developed. The solutions for the approximation problems clarify that an MI-based privacy metric preserves the privacy of the source symbols in inverse proportion to their likelihoods.
utility of the published data and the privacy of the respondents in the dataset.
We consider the problem of privacy-guaranteed data publishing hypothesis testing. The use of large datasets to test two or more hypotheses (e.g., the 99%-1% theory of income distribution in the United States [1] ) relies on the classical statistical inference framework of binary or multiple hypothesis testing. The optimal test for hypothesis testing under various scenarios (non-Bayesian, Bayesian, minimax) involves the so-called Neyman-Pearson (or likelihood ratio) test [2] in which the likelihood ratio of the hypotheses is compared to a given threshold. We focus exclusively on the non-Bayesian setting. In particular, for m-ary (m ≥ 2) hypothesis testing problem, we consider the setting in which the probability of missed detection is minimized for one specific hypothesis (e.g., presence of cancer) while requiring the probabilities of false alarm for the same hypothesis to be bounded (relative to the remaining hypotheses). In this context, we can apply the Chernoff-Stein Lemma [3, Ch. 11] which states that for a pair of hypotheses the largest error exponent of the missed detection probability, under the constraint that the false alarm probability is bounded above by a constant, is the relative entropy between the probability distributions for the two hypotheses.
Inspired by the Chernoff-Stein lemma, for the m-ary hypothesis setting described above, we use relative entropy as a measure of the utility of the published dataset (for hypothesis testing), and henceforth, refer to this as the relative entropy setting. Furthermore, for binary hypothesis testing (m = 2), we also consider the setting in which the probabilities of both missed detection and false alarm decrease exponentially. For this setting, using known results of hypothesis testing [4] , we take the Rényi divergence as the utility metric and refer to this as the Rényi divergence setting. For the privacy metric, we use mutual information between the original and published datasets as a measure of the additional knowledge (privacy leakage) gained on average from the published dataset. By bounding the MI leakages, our goal is to develop privacy mechanisms that restrict the relative entropy between the prior and posterior (after publishing) distributions of the dataset, averaged over the published dataset. By restricting the distance between prior and posterior beliefs, we capture a large class of computationally unbounded adversaries that can use different inference methods. Specifically, bounding MI leakage allows us to exploit information-theoretic relationships between MI and the probabilities of detection/estimation to bound the ability of an adversary to "learn" the original dataset [3] , [5] , [6] .
Finally, we want to highlight the motivation for studying the high privacy regime. Strong privacy protection guarantees can be assuring to data respondents. In fact, it is highly desirable to provide as strong a privacy guarantee as possible for a desired utility. This in turn makes it crucial to understand the utility guarantees that MI-based privacy mechanisms can provide in the high privacy regime. Such an analysis of the trade-off in the extremal high privacy regime has been considered under locally differential privacy (L-DP) in [7] . More generally, interest in evaluating performance in the extremal regimes of operation is a common aspect of research in information theory and machine learning as evidenced by, among others, understanding very noisy channels in single-and multi-user settings [8] , [9] and understanding the fundamental limits of learning graphical models [10] .
A. Our Contributions
We study the privacy-preserving data publishing problem by considering a local privacy model in which the same (memoryless) mechanism is applied independently to each entry of the dataset. This allows the respondents of a dataset to apply the privacy mechanism before sharing data.
The local privacy setting is motivated by practical applications. Enterprises such as Apple and Google prefer to provide privacy protections before collecting data, which implies that the underlying privacy mechanism used by each data respondent is by definition memoryless. 1) We introduce the privacy-utility trade-off (PUT) problem for hypothesis testing (Section II). The resulting PUT involves maximizing the minimum of a set of relative entropies, subject to constraints on the MI-based leakages for all source classes. 2) The PUT problem involves maximizing the minimum of a set of convex functions over a convex set which is, in general, NP-hard. In Section III, we approximate the trade-off in the high privacy regime (near zero leakage) using techniques from Euclidean information theory (E-IT); these techniques have found use in deriving capacity results in [8] and [9] . 3) For binary hypothesis testing, we first consider the relative entropy setting (Section IV-A), in which we determine the optimal mechanism in closed form for the E-IT approximation by exploring the problem structure. Our results suggest that the solution to the E-IT approximation is independent of the alphabet size and, more importantly, that a MI-based privacy metric preserves the privacy of the source symbols inversely proportional to their likelihoods, thereby, providing more distortion to the (informative) outliers in the dataset which, in general, are more vulnerable to detection.
4)
We extend our analysis to the Rényi divergence setting (Section IV-B), the optimal mechanism for its E-IT approximation problem in high privacy regime is similar in form to the relative entropy setting. 5) We study the m-ary hypothesis testing problem (Section V) and show that optimal solutions of the E-IT approximation can be obtained via semidefinite programs (SDPs) [11] . Specially, for binary sources the optimal mechanism is derived in closed form. The dependence on the source distribution is highlighted here as well. 6) In Section VI, via numerical simulations, we uncover regimes of distribution tuples and leakage values for which the E-IT approximation is accurate.
B. Related Work
Privacy-guaranteed hypothesis testing in the high privacy regime using MI as the privacy metric was first studied by Liao [12] . Specifically, the focus of [12] is on the relative entropy setting of binary hypothesis test in the high privacy regime. We significantly extend that work with three key contributions: (a) we derive optimal mechanisms in the high privacy regime for binary hypothesis test in the Rényi divergence setting; (b) we derive optimal mechanisms in the high privacy regime for the m-ary problem in relative entropy setting; (c) we provide detailed illustrations of results for binary and m-ary hypothesis testing.
Recently, the problem of designing privacy mechanisms for hypothesis testing has gained interest. Kairouz et al. [7] show that the optimal L-DP mechanism has a staircase form and can be obtained as a solution of a linear program. Gaboardi et al. [13] deal with a privacy-guaranteed hypothesis testing by using chi-square goodness of fit as the utility measure and adding Gaussian or Laplace noise to dataset to guarantee DP-based privacy protection.
Our problem differs from these efforts in using MI as the privacy metrics. In [7] , the L-DP formulation, focused on the high privacy regime, requires the mechanism to limit distinction between any two letters of the source alphabet for a given output. The requirement also gathers all privacy mechanisms satisfying a desired privacy protection measured by L-DP within a hypercube. Therefore, the authors simplify the trade-off problem to a linear program by exploring the sub-linearity of the relative entropy function. In contrast, all privacy mechanisms giving a desired MI-based privacy form a convex set which is not a polytope. However, taking advantage of E-IT, we propose good approximations for the MI-based privacy utility trade-offs in high privacy regime. In fact, we present closed-form privacy mechanisms for both binary hypothesis testing with arbitrary alphabets as well as m-ary hypothesis testing with binary alphabets. Furthermore, for m-ary hypothesis testing with arbitrary sources, the privacy mechanism can be attained effectively by solving an SDP.
The connection between hypothesis testing and privacy has been studied in the context of location anonymization and smart meter privacy. In location privacy, the problem of determining if a sequence of anonymized data points (e.g. location positions without an accompanying user ID) belongs to a target user can be formulated as a hypothesis test. More specifically, if the distribution of the user's data is known and unique among other users, any observed sequence can be tested against the hypothesis that it was drawn from this distribution, thus revealing if it belongs to the target user. Within this context, Montazeri et al. [14] , [15] studied the problem of anonymizing sequences of location data, and characterized the probability of correctly guessing a target user's data within a larger dataset. In related work on smart meter privacy, Li and Oechtering [16] considered the problem of private information leakage in a smart grid. Here, an adversary challenges a consumer's privacy by performing an unauthorized binary hypothesis test on the consumer's behavior based on smart meter readings. Li and Oechtering [16] propose a solution for mitigating the incurred privacy risk with the assist of an alternative energy source.
The theoretical analysis done by Montazeri et al. [14] , [15] and Li and Oechtering [16] are related to the one presented here in that they also make use of large deviation (informationtheoretic) results in hypothesis testing. However, we apply these powerful theoretical tools to a different setting, in which data is purposefully randomized before disclosure in order to provide privacy, while guaranteeing utility in terms of a successful hypothesis test. Whereas they consider a hypothesis testing adversary, here we consider a precise hypothesis test as part of the utility metric.
MI has been amply used as a measure for quantifying information leakage within the information-theoretic privacy literature (see [5] , [6] , [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] and the references therein). The connection between MI-based metrics and other privacy metrics has been studied, for example, by Makhdoumi and Fawaz [22] . In the present paper, we approximate MI by the chi-squared divergence which, in turn, also posses interesting estimation-theoretic properties [23] . An exploration of the role of chi-squared related metrics in privacy has appeared in the work of Asoodeh et al. [24] , [25] .
C. Notation
We use bold capital letters to represent matrices, e.g., X is a matrix with the i th row (or column) being X i and the (i, j ) th entry X i j . We use bold lower case letters to represent vectors, e.g. x is a vector with the i th entry x i . Sets are denoted by capital calligraphic letters.
For vectors a and b, and functions f and g,
is a diagonal matrix with the i th diagonal entry being
] has diagonal entries
. We denote the l 2 -norm of a vector x by x, the logarithm of x to the base 2 as log x. Probability mass functions are denoted as row vectors, e.g., p. In addition, D(··) denotes the relative entropy and I (·; ·) denotes the MI. We can write the MI between two random variables or between a probability distribution and the corresponding conditional probability matrix. Indeed, for two random variables X,X with X ∼ p andX |{X = x} ∼ WX |X =x , the MI is denoted as I (X;X ) or I (p, WX |X ).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. General Hypothesis Testing
We consider an m-ary hypothesis testing problem that distinguishes between m ≥ 2 explanations for an observed dataset. Let X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) denote a sequence of n random variables, where the entries X i are drawn independently according to a probability distribution p. The observed random variables are assumed to be discrete with alphabet X and size |X | = M. The m hypotheses are denoted as H k : p = p k for k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Our utility goal is to make a decision about the underlying distribution of the data X n . Let the disjoint decision regions be A (n) k . This means that if X n belongs to A (n) k , we decide in favor of H k .
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing
In binary hypothesis testing, there are only two hypotheses:
The optimum test is the Neyman-Pearson test in which the decision region for hypothesis
2 be the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection for H 1 , respectively. Use β (n) 2 (δ) to indicate the smallest probability of the missed detection subject to the condition that β
Hence, we use D(p 2 p 1 ) as our utility function.
C. m-Ary Hypothesis Testing
In m-ary hypothesis testing, there are m(m − 1) different errors resulting from mistaking hypothesis H i for H j , i = j . To keep our analysis simple, we consider a scenario somewhat analogous to the "red alert" [26] problem in "unequal error protection" [27] . There is one distinguished hypothesis H 1 whose inference takes precedence. For example, in practice p 1 could be the underlying distribution of measurements of a malignant tumor; the other distributions p 2 , . . . , p k could be the underlying distributions of measurements of various benign tumors. We would like to minimize the miss-detection rate of H 1 . In this scenario, we consider m − 1 hypothesis tests, each between p 1 and p k for k = 1. We would like to maximize the minimum of E 1,k over k ∈ {2, . . . , m}, where E 1,k is the error exponent (exponential rate of decay of the error probability analogous to (1)) of mistaking H k when H 1 is true.
D. Privacy Considerations
In most data collection and classification applications, there may be an additional requirement to ensure that the dataset, while providing utility, does not leak information about the respondents of the data. This in turn implies that the data provided to the hypothesis test is not the same as the original data, but instead a randomized version that guarantees precise measures of privacy (information leakage) and utility.
Specifically, we use MI as a measure of the average information leakage between the input dataset and its randomized output dataset that is used by the test. The goal is to find the randomizing mapping, henceforth referred to a privacy mechanism, such that a measure of utility of the data is maximized while ensuring that the MI-based leakages for all possible source classes are bounded.
We assume that the entries of the dataset are generated in an i.i.d. fashion. Focusing on the local privacy model, the randomizing privacy mechanism for the hypothesis testing problem is memoryless. Let W, an M × N conditional probability matrix, denote this memoryless privacy mechanism which maps the M letters of the input alphabet X to N letters of the output alphabetX , where N ≥ 2 is an arbitrary finite integer. Thus, the i.i.d. sequence X n ∼ p k , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, is mapped to an output sequenceX n whose entriesX j ∈X for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} are i.i.d. with the distribution p k W. Thus, the hypothesis test is now performed on a sequenceX n that belongs to one of m source classes with distributions 1 p k W. For the m-ary setting, the error exponent, corresponding to the missed detection of
E. The Privacy-Utility Trade-Off
To design an appropriate privacy mechanism, we wish to maximize the minimum of the m − 1 error exponents D(p k Wp 1 W) subject to the following leakage constraints:
Formally, the privacyutility trade-off (PUT) problem is that finding the optimal privacy mechanism W * of the following optimization:
where W is the set of M × N row stochastic matrices, and
The optimization in (2) maximizes the minimum of m − 1 convex functions over a convex set. Since the m − 1 convex functions have the same monotonic behaviors and the maximum of each one is attained on the boundary of the feasible region, the optimal solution of the optimization is also on the boundary. Because of the MI constraints, the feasible region is, in general, not a polytope, and thus, has infinitely many extremal points. While there exist computationally tractable methods to obtain a solution by approximating the feasible region by an intersection of polytopes [28] , our focus is on developing a principled approximation for (2) in a specific privacy regime to obtain a closed-from and easilyinterpretable privacy mechanism. Specifically, we will work in the high privacy regime in which k is small. In this regime, one can use Taylor series expansions to approximate both the objective function and the constraints. Such approximations were considered in [8] and [29] . More recently, analyses based on such approximations, referred to as E-IT, have been found to be useful in a variety settings from graphical model learning [10] to network information theory problems [8] , [9] .
III. APPROXIMATIONS IN THE HIGH PRIVACY REGIME
In this section, we develop E-IT approximations of the relative entropy D(p k Wp 1 W) and the MI I (p k , W) functions, based on which we propose an approximation of PUT in (2) in the high privacy regime.
To develop an approximation, we select an operating point which will be perturbed to provide an approximately-optimal privacy mechanism. We let k ∈ [0, * ] for all k where * min{H (p k ), k ∈ {1, . . . , m}}. Since our focus is on the high privacy regime, we present the approximation around a perfect privacy operation point, i.e., a privacy mechanism W 0 that achieves k = 0 for all k.
Lemma 1: For perfect privacy, i.e., k = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the privacy mechanism W 0 is a rank-1 row stochastic matrix with every row being equal to a row vector w 0 where w 0 belongs to probability simplex, such that the entries
and
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward: the mutual information I (p, W) is 0 if and only if every row W i , i ∈ {1, . . . , M}, of W satisfies the condition D(W i pW) = 0; this, in turn, implies every row of W equals to pW [3, Th. 2.6.3], which is denoted as w 0 in Lemma 1. Thus, for the perfect privacy setting, the optimal mechanism does not rely on the input distribution.
Remark 1: Note that, for any W 0 that achieves perfect privacy, the utility is D(p k W 0 p 1 W 0 ) = 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . , m}. Furthermore, the rows of W 0 , i.e., w 0 , can take any value in an N-dimensional probability simplex.
The following proposition presents an E-IT approximation for the objective and constraint functions of the optimization in (2) 
In (5) and (7), the notation ≈ means that the difference between the left and right sides is o(
Similarly, in (6) amd (8) , ≈ means that the two sides differ by o( 2 ∞ ). Note that in Proposition 1, w 0 is in the interior of the probability simplex, i.e., w 0 > 0. The approximation results from the observation that all rows of a privacy mechanism W in the high privacy (low leakage) regime are very close to each other and both the relative entropy and MI can be approximated by the χ 2 divergence. The detailed proof is in Appendix A.
IV. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN
THE HIGH PRIVACY REGIME For binary hypothesis testing, there are only two hypotheses H 1 : p = p 1 and H 2 : p = p 2 , and therefore, only two types of errors. In this section, we consider the simplest hypothesis testing scenario under two regimes. First, we regard one of the two hypotheses (e.g., H 1 ) as being more important than the other. In this case, the goal is to maximize the exponent of the missed detection for H 1 subject to an upper bound on its false alarm probability. Second, both hypotheses are important and the goal is to maximize a weighted sum of the two exponents of the false alarm and missed detection. For both cases, we derive the PUTs in the high privacy regime and provide methods to attain explicit privacy mechanisms.
A. Binary Hypothesis Testing (Relative Entropy Setting)
We consider the case in which the false alarm of H 1 is bounded by a fixed positive constant and we examine the fastest rate of decay of its missed detection. This is exactly the problem formulated in Section II, and the PUT in (2) becomes
where W is the set of all M × N row stochastic matrices, and k ∈ [0, H (p k )], are the permissible upper bounds of the privacy leakages for the two distributions p 1 and p 2 , respectively. Using the approximations in Proposition 1, the PUT for the E-IT approximation problem in the high privacy regime with 0
where A i is the i -th row of the M × N matrix A, w 0 is an interior point of the N-dimensional probability simplex, and √ w 0 is a row vector with the i th entry being the squared root of the i th entry of w 0 , i.e., √ w 0,i . 
Finally, it suffices to restrict the output to a binary alphabet, i.e., N = 2. The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B. We briefly summarize the approach. The simplification of (10) to a vector optimization in (11) results from the observation that the privacy constraint (10b) only restricts the row-norms of the matrix variable A, whereas A affects the objective (10a) through all inner products of rows in A. By exploiting this special structure, we simplify (10) to a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) with a vector variable a which governs the Euclidean norms of the rows in A. The optimal A * is then given by (12) such that the row vector v is chosen to satisfy (10c). Since (13) can be satisfied by a 2-dimensional v, we conclude that a binary output alphabet suffices.
Note that the objective function and constraints of the QCQP in (11) are "even" functions, i.e., if a is feasible, so is its negation −a and both of them yield the same objective value. Using this observation, we derive a convex program by removing the square in the objective function.
The following theorem provides a closed-form privacy mechanism for the PUT (10) in high privacy regime by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for convex programs. 
and the optimal solution a * is
2) if only the second constraint in (11) is active,
3) when both constraints in (11) are active, the optimal solution a * is
where η * 1 > 0 and η * 2 > 0 satisfy
The proof of Theorem 2 involves proving two lemmas and is developed in Appendix C. 
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing (Rényi Divergence Setting)
We now consider the scenario in which both the false alarm and missed detection probabilities for H 1 are exponentially decreasing. For this case, the trade-off between the two error probabilities is captured by the Rényi divergence as shown in [4] and [30] . We use this as our utility metric and briefly review the results in [4] and [30] as a starting point.
Assume that the false alarm probability decays as exp(−n E 2,1 ), for some exponent E 2,1 > 0. Then, the largest error exponent of the missed detection E 1,2 for a fixed E 2,1 is a function of E 2,1 given by [30] 
Since (23) is a convex program, it can be equivalently characterized by the Lagrangian minimization
leading to the dual problem [30] 
The p * optimizing (24) can be computed using the KKT conditions of (23) 
where D α (p 2 p 1 ) is the order-α Rényi divergence. From the preceding derivations, and the fact that β = α 1−α , we see that α ∈ (0, 1) parametrizes the trade-off between the two error exponents E 1,2 and E 2,1 , i.e.,
Thus D α (p 2 p 1 ) serves as a reasonable candidate for a utility metric in this setting because it is a linear combination of the two positive error exponents according to (28) . For this metric, one can write the PUT problem as
Analogous to the PUT in (9) with relative entropy as the utility metric, the optimization in (29) 
The proof is detailed in Appendix D. According to Proposition 1, any privacy mechanism W in the high privacy regime is a perturbation of a perfect privacy mechanism W 0 . When k in (29) (
From (31), we observe that as 1 , p 1 W ) . As a result, in the high privacy regime we revert to the relative entropy setting, for which we provide a closed-form solution in Theorem 2.
V. m-ARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN THE HIGH PRIVACY REGIME
We now consider the m-ary hypothesis testing problem with m distinct hypotheses H k , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, each corresponding to a distribution p k . This in turn results in m(m − 1) error probabilities of incorrectly inferring hypothesis H i as hypothesis H j . As stated in Section II, to simplify our analysis, we consider a scenario somewhat analogous to the "red alert" [26] problem in "unequal error protection" [27] , i.e., there is one distinct hypothesis H 1 , the inference of which is more crucial than that of others (e.g., presence of cancer). However, our formulation is slightly different from [26] and [27] . 3 In fact, we consider m − 1 distinct binary hypotheses tests between H 1 and H k , k = 1, i.e., test k ∈ {2, . . . , m} reads
2 We say that a vector p 2 converges to another vector p 1 , denoted as p 2 → p 1 , if p 2 − p 1 ∞ → 0. 3 Nazer et al. [26] and Borade et al. [27] consider an m-ary hypothesis testing/decoding problem where the sample space is partitioned into m disjoint regions, each denoting the declaration of a hypothesis. This is different from the problem we consider in (32) where there are m − 1 distinct tests in which each of the tests involves partitioning the sample space into two disjoint regions.
Each one of these tests has an optimal type-II error exponent (declaring H k is true when in fact H 1 is true) D(p k p 1 ). Thus, we focus on maximizing (over privacy mechanisms W) the minimum of the m − 1 error exponents corresponding to the m − 1 ways of incorrectly deciding H 1 as H k , k = 1.
For this problem of unequal m-ary hypothesis testing, we introduce the PUT in (2) . We can further simplify the trade-off in the high privacy regime using Proposition 1 to obtain the following PUT:
Recall that A ∈ R M×N is a perturbation matrix such that the privacy mechanism W is related to W 0 as W = W 0 +A[ √ w 0 ], and A i is the i th row of A.
For ease of analysis, we start from a simplified version of (33) without the constraint (33c), which can be transformed to a semi-definite program (SDP) as summarized in the following lemma. Based on an optimal solution of the SDP, a scheme is proposed for constructing an optimal solution A * of (33) satisfying (33c). Lemma 3 stems from the observation that both the objective function (33a) and constraints (33b) are linear functions of the entries of the positive semidefinite matrix AA T . The proof for Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix E. The following theorem shows that the solution of the SDP in (34) yields an optimal privacy mechanism for the approximated PUT in (33) .
Lemma 3: The optimization in (33a) with constraint (33b) is equivalent to an SDP with (M × M matrix) variable
Theorem 3: An optimal privacy mechanism W for the optimization problem in (33) is 
where * is an M × (l + 1) rectangular diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the square roots of the l non-zero eigenvalues λ of B * , U * is a unitary matrix consisting of the eigenvectors of B * , and V is an (l +1)×(l +1) unitary matrix whose the first l columns are orthogonal to √ w 0 . Proof: Let B * be the optimal solution of the SDP in (34) and l rank(B * ). We decompose B * via an eigenvalue decomposition as follows:
Here, [λ] is an l ×l diagonal matrix consisting of entries in the eigenvalue vector λ and the columns of the M × l matrix U * are the l corresponding eigenvectors. Construct an l × (l + 1) rectangular diagonal matrix * by adding one all-zero column to [ √ λ]. Let N = l + 1. By choosing a (l + 1) × (l + 1) unitary matrix V, whose last column parallel to the (l +1)-dimensional row vector √ w 0 , we design a matrix A * as U * * V T such that
From Lemma 3, the SDP in (34) is equivalent to the simplified (33) without (33c). Therefore, A * optimizes the simplified (33) . In addition,
where (39) follows from the fact that the last column of the (l + 1) × (l + 1) unitary matrix V is parallel to √ w 0 , such that the first l columns of V are orthogonal to √ w 0 , and the inner product of its last column and √ w 0 is the Euclidean norm of √ w 0 . Therefore, the A * constructed above is feasible and attains the optimal value of (33).
Remark 4: Note that the size of output alphabet is at most M + 1. For the special case of binary hypothesis testing, we have shown in Theorem 1 that the rank of B * is 1 and therefore, N = 2, i.e, the output of the optimal mechanism is binary. The same result (in output size) is observed when local differential privacy is used as privacy metric for binary hypothesis testing with the same utility metric in the high privacy regime [7, Th. 2.3] .
Remark 5: In the absence of any constraints in (33), analogous to the binary hypothesis test, one would choose min{m − 1, M − 1} columns of U to span the space contained by the vectors p k − p 1 for all k = 1. However, the constraints in (33) depend explicitly on the vectors p k , and in fact, in (34) at least one constraint will be tight at the optimal solution B * . Thus, analogous to the binary hypothesis result, we expect the optimal mechanism to depend inversely on one or more p k . We show that this is indeed the case for binary sources in the following subsection.
A. m-Ary Hypotheses Testing With Binary Sources
If all the m distributions p k are Bernoulli, the m − 1 difference vectors p k − p 1 in (33) are collinear.
Thus, the minimizing element in the objective is the one in which p k − p 1 has the minimal Euclidean norm. Without loss of generality, assume
. . , m}. In this case, the E-IT approximation in (33) 
We notice that (41) has the same form as (10) (the E-IT approximation for binary hypothesis testing for the relative entropy setting), where the number of constraints in (41b) is m ≥ 2. Specifically, the objective and constraints have the same structure as in (10), and thus, the results in Theorem 1 holds here. Therefore, from Theorem 2, the corresponding optimal privacy mechanism can be expressed as (15) but with
where η * k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , m, are the dual variables for the m constraints in (41b).
Note that for those η * k that are non-zero, the corresponding constraints in (41b) are tight, i.e., if η * k > 0,
. . , m}. Thus, the a * in (42) depends inversely on a linear combination of the distributions indexed by K. Consequently, the optimal mechanism for the approximated PUT depends inversely on these distributions.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the utilities achieved by optimal privacy mechanisms for E-IT approximations in two scenarios: m = 2 (binary) and m = 3 (ternary) hypothesis testing. Furthermore, for the binary hypothesis testing scenario, we consider both the relative entropy and Rényi divergence settings, while for the m = 3 scenario, we only focus on the relative entropy setting. Our goal is to compare the maximal utility for the E-IT approximation with that achieved for the original PUT. To this end, we start by choosing a privacy leakage level k =˜ min k H (p k ), for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for the E-IT approximation.
Recall that for the relative entropy setting, (35) in Theorem 3 provides an optimal privacy mechanism W (˜ ) for the E-IT approximation problem in (33) with leakage bounds k =˜ for all k. Specifically, for m = 2, W (˜ ) can also be expressed as (15) in Theorem 2, where a * and v are the first columns of U * * and V in (35), respectively. From Corollary 1, in the high privacy regime W (˜ ) in (15) is also the optimal mechanism (for the approximated PUT) for binary hypothesis testing in Rényi divergence setting.
To evaluate the performance of W , we compare its utility to that achieved by an optimal mechanism W * of the original PUT problem (e.g., (2) for the relative entropy setting or (29) for the Rényi divergence setting). For a fair comparison of the utilities resulting from the E-IT and original PUTs, we choose the MI leakages to be the same for both cases. Thus, for the relative entropy setting (resp. Rényi divergence setting (α = 0.5), we compare the values of W (˜ ) ). For both the relative entropy and Rényi divergence settings, to highlight the reduction in utility resulting from the use of the privacy mechanism, we normalize the error exponent (under privacy) with that achieved without privacy guarantees. We also note that the inverse of this ratio is the sample complexity of guaranteeing privacy, i.e., the factor gain in samples needed with privacy guarantees to achieve the same error probability without such guarantees.
For the original PUT problems in (2) and (29), the number of independent variables in W is M(M − 1) for M = N. Even for M = 3, finding the optimal privacy mechanism W * ( ) using exhaustive search techniques 4 is computationally prohibitive. Therefore, we restrict our numerical analysis to binary sources, i.e., M = 2; furthermore, for numerical tractability in computing W * ( ), we assume that M = N = 2, i.e., the output alphabet is binary.
For the E-IT approximated PUTs, since the choice of w 0 does not affect the optimal A * , we choose w 0 = (0.5, 0.5), for which from (13) and (14), we have v = ±( √ 0.5, − √ 0.5). To capture the high privacy regime, we restrict˜ ≤ 0.2 min k H (p k ). For these parameters, the following two subsections illustrate and discuss the regimes in which the E-IT approximation is accurate.
A. Binary Hypothesis Testing
We consider four pairs of Bernoulli distributions as shown in Table I for the two source classes (hypotheses) to evaluate the accuracy of optimal mechanisms for the E-IT approximation in the relative entropy and Rényi divergence settings. Figures 2a-2d illustrate the normalized utilities for Pairs 1-4 in Table I , respectively, as a function of the normalized MI leakages, i.e., / min{H (p 1 ), H (p 2 )}. In the four figures, the left and right y-axes are for normalized utilities in the relative entropy and Rényi divergence settings, respectively. Figures 2a and 2d show that W and W * have the same utilities in the regions highlighted by the black-dotted ellipses, in which is smaller than 0.5% and 0.1% of min{H (p 1 ), H (p 2 )}, respectively. In contrast, for Figs. 2b and 2c, the utilities of W and W * are almost the same in the entire plotted range.
From Figs. 2a-2d, we deduce that for any two given distributions, there is high privacy regime in which the performance of the privacy mechanism W for the E-IT approximation is almost optimal; however, the range of the regime is specific to the distribution pairs. In particular, when both distributions are
B. Ternary Hypothesis Testing
We numerically evaluate our results for ternary hypothesis testing using three Bernoulli distributions, one for each of the three hypotheses. As shown in Table II , we consider two such triples. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the normalized utilities for Triples 1 and 2, respectively, as a function of the normalized MI leakages, i.e., / min k {H (p k ), k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. Fig. 3a shows that the normalized utilities for W and W * are almost the same in the entire plotted range for Triple 1. As shown in Fig. 3b , for Triple 2, the normalized utilities for W and W * are close only in the region where the MI-based leakages are less than 0.2% of min k H (p k . As for the binary case, here too, our plots show that the leakage range for which the approximation is tight depends on the distributions. For Triple 1, the good performance of the optimal mechanism W exists for a larger set of MI leakages than for Triple 2, because the three distributions in Triple 1 are close to uniform distribution such that the E-IT approximation is accurate.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have systematically studied the problem of publishing large datasets for binary and m-ary hypothesis testing under privacy constraints. Our goal, broadly, is to characterize the guarantees that can be made on the error exponents when a MI-based constraint on the leakage of data from any source class is bounded. Our model seeks to understand if one can find the true probability distribution of a given dataset among a set of possible distributions without revealing the respondents of the data. We have shown that the optimal PUT is achieved through a randomizing privacy mechanism which maximizes the minimum of a set of the relative entropies between pairs of distributions (one for each hypothesis), while ensuring that the MI-based leakages for all source classes are bounded. Focusing on the high privacy regime, we have developed an E-IT approximation of the PUT problem. For this problem, we have shown that the optimal mechanism can be viewed as a perturbation of a perfect privacy mechanism where the perturbation is computed as a solution to a convex optimization problem. As is expected of statistical metrics such as relative entropy and MI, our results reveal that the randomizing mechanism perturbs the statistical outliers the most for each source class. Such a mechanism ensures both utility (predominantly provided by the non-outliers) while preserving privacy of those most vulnerable to inference attacks.
Future work includes developing optimal mechanisms and PUTs for all possible leakage levels. Comparison with other privacy metrics is also of interest. 
where W 0 is a mechanism achieving perfect privacy with all rows equal to w 0 , where w 0 is chosen such that its entries w 0 j = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and is a matrix with
where the radius of the neighborhood around w 0 is ρ ∈ [0, 1). Note that (44) is derived from the row stochasticity of W and W 0 . The constraint in (45) captures the fact that Consider first the optimization over . Since the objective is linear in and the feasible region of is a hypercube, (56) is a linear program whose optimal solution is at one of the extreme points of the hypercube [31, Th. 3.5.3], i.e., the optimal solution * has entries | * i, j | = 1 for all i, j . Thus, all the rows of an A maximizing (55) are parallel, and therefore, the optimal solution A * of (55) is a rank-1 matrix.
In addition, from the objective function in (56), if the signs of 1 i and 1 j are known for any i, j ∈ {2, . . . , M}, the sign of i j can be determined. Furthermore, maximizing the objective requires that i j has the same sign as its coefficient i j . Therefore, * i j = * 
The optimal solution A * of (55) is related to a * optimizing (57) as follows:
The optimal solution in (57) yields both the magnitude and sign of a i for all i . Also, v in (58) can be chosen to satisfy
Thus, by using (58) and (59) and solving for a * in (11), we obtain A * in (10) as desired. For any w 0 ∈ R N , the condition N = 2 is sufficient to obtain a v satisfying v( √ w 0 ) T = 0, i.e., A * ( √ w 0 ) T = 0. Therefore, binary output alphabets suffices.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we use Theorem 1 and two lemmas. The problem in (11) maximizes a convex function over a convex set, and thus, it is not a convex program. However, we show how the problem can be reduced to a convex program and we also obtain a closed-form solution.
Lemma 4: The following convex program completely determines the solutions of (11),
such that the optimal solutions of (11) are ±a * where a * is the optimal solution of (60).
Proof: For the optimization problem in (11) 
In (60) and (62), the two objectives depend on a in the same manner and their constraint functions are the same. Hence the optimal solution a * of (60) optimizes (62). Since the objective and constraint functions of (62) are even, −a * is feasible and yields the optimal value, i.e, −a * is also optimal for (62). The optimal solution a * of (60) can be evaluated by observing that at a * , either one or both constraints are active. The following lemma summarizes the optimal solution of (60). From Lemma 4, one can then obtain the optimal solution (11).
Lemma 5: The optimal solutions of (11) (21) and (22) . Proof: From Lemma 4, to find the optimal solutions of (11), it suffices to find the optimal solution to (60). In (60), the objective function is linear in a. Since p 1 and p 2 are interior points of probability simplex, both p 1 and p 2 are positive definite, i.e., the two constraint functions are convex in a. Thus, this is a convex program. In addition, a = 0 strictly satisfies the two constraints for positive 1 and 2 , which means that (60) satisfies Slater's condition [11, Sec. 5.2.3] . Therefore, the convex program has zero duality gap, and the optimal solutions are given by the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [11, Sec. 5.5.3] :
(63g) where f 0 , f 1 , and f 2 represent the objective and two constraint functions of (60), respectively, a * is the optimal solution of (60), and η * 1 and η * 2 are the optimal solutions of the dual problem of (60). From (63a), we have
When η * 1 > 0 and η * 2 = 0, i.e., the first constraint is active, the optimal solution a * of (60) is
such that from (63b),
